Editorial
The Utility of Thresholds and the Threshold Utility Thresholds are a convenience. They can summarize complex sensitivity analyses and provide decision makers (both physicians and patients) with decision rules: take one action if a particular parameter's value is below the threshold; take another action if the parameter's value is above the threshold. If the parameter's value just equals the threshold, the two actions should have equal expected utilities and decision makers should be indifferent between the actionsflipping a coin or asking the opinion of a friend or colleague should then be quite satisfactory.
This threshold approach to clinical decision making antedated the concept of the close call or tossup.' If two strategies need not be exactly equal in expected utility for us to be indifferent between them, then the threshold approach must be modified. Instead of a threshold point, we recognize a zone of indifference; if a parameter's value falls within that zone, then the decision will be a close call. But how close is close enough? Few investigators have addressed the relation between close calls and the mathematics of threshold analysis. Why not? Actually for quite good reasons. Microcomputers programs that ease the calculational burden of analyzing decision trees now make it feasible to perform one-way sensitivity analyses routinely, providing insights about not only which strategy is preferred but also the strength of that preference. Thresholds compactly identify the better strategy but do not tell how much might be lost by selecting a different plan. This loss of information is analogous to setting a criterion for defining a positive laboratory test result. All positives are reported as equal, but we all know that some are more equal than others.
In some circles, the threshold concept refers to a more restricted approach-an equation used to calculate threshold values for a particular prototypical decision tree. If a computer or an adequate penchant for arithmetic is not available, such formulas provide a rapid solution to a decision problem because they do not begin with a tabula rasa : a brand new tree need not be created and debugged. Furthermore, the threshold equations often provide interesting insights into the relations among variables. Of course, these benefits accrue only when the prototypical model fits the clinical decision at hand. If important elements are not adequately reflected in the model, then decisions based on the threshold equation may be inappropriate. Unfortunately, the clinician who requires a rough and ready analysis may have neither the time nor the analytic insight required to identify when such decisions are wrong.
We believe that such prototypical threshold equations should be restricted to models that are sufficiently general to represent adequately a variety of problems encountered at the bedside and in the clinic.
In this context, we have substantial reservations about the utility threshold approach proposed by Nease and Bonduelle.3 Based on our experience in applying decision analysis to patient care, we believe that the decision tree that forms the basis for their threshold equations will not be widely applicable. First, a cured patient and a patient without disease are often not equivalent. A patient with &dquo;cured&dquo; prostatic cancer and a patient without prostatic cancer will not have identical survival curves. Conversely, if the patient suffers from a potentially treatable symptom, then the persistence of that symptom (because the treatable disease is not present) might well be worse than being &dquo;cured&dquo; of the disease. If those utilities are not equivalent, then their threshold equations must be modified: the numerator of the second term of each equation would then depend on the difference in those utilities and on the probability of disease.
Second, in many important decisions problems, the central diagnostic test is not free of risk and morbidity, as the authors have assumed. Third, the cost of treatment is not always linearly proportional to the utilities assigned to normal life and uncured disease, as is the case when that cost is represented as an equivalent risk of death. The burden of a thoracotomy may weigh more heavily on a patient, uncured of his disease, who is destined to die within three years than on a patient who can expect to survive for two more decades.
Most importantly, however, clinical problems are rarely restricted to only three outcomes: normal life, uncured disease, and death. In two additional applications of this model (the first reference in their paper), the authors have reduced multiple outcome states to a single parameter, in one case by linking utilities by a simple proportion and in the other by taking the five-year survival rates as given and assuming a utility function that demonstrates constant risk aversion. We doubt the generality of these solutions. Because we found that the structure and assumptions of this model did not adequately reflect clinical dynamics, we wonder whether its results may be misleading.
On the other hand, we strongly support the argument that sensitivity and threshold analyses should be performed on utilities as well as on probabilities. Even without considering patient preferences, utilities merely summarize the future events engendered in an outcome description and certainly should be subjected to sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, the elements in a decision model that reflect the personal preferences of the patient (such as the adjustment to quality of life for continued symptoms) should also be subjected to sensitivity analyses. If the patient has difficulty in assigning utilities to alternative outcomes, knowing that the optimal decision remains the same over the full range of assigned utilities can be most helpful. Using a decision model to counsel over one thousand prospective parents about prenatal diagnosis, we have often relied on such sensitivity analyses, summarized as a graphic representation of a two-way sensitivity analysis rather than as an equation.4 4 Even if a patient's preferences between hypothetical scenarios have been used to deduce personalized parameters for a formal utility function, we wonder whether such functions adequately reflect patient preferences. Clinical decision analysts have not yet come to grips with how to decide which (if any) formal utility model is appropriate for a given patient and how to assess the parameters of such a function in a simple, convenient, reliable way. Except for the sim-plest functions, more than one parameter of preference will be required. Even with functions demonstrating constant risk aversion which require a single preference parameter, other elements of utility (e.g., the survival curve) should be examined by sensitivity analyses. Thus, we doubt that the utility threshold equations suggested by Nease and Bonduelle will have much practical application in the clinical arena, but we hope their work will stimulate further exploration of sensitivity analysis as a tool to be applied not only to probabilities but also to measures of preference.--STEPHEN G. PAUKER, MD, SUSAN P. PAUKER, MD, JOHN B. WONG, MD, Boston, Massachusetts
